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 dvances in technology have always, it seems, been weaponized when 
the opportunity presented itself. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wil-
liam J. Lynn, III, once said, “Few weapons in the history of warfare, once 
created, have gone unused.”1 Similarly, in President Harry Truman’s radio 
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address to the American people after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hi-
roshima, he stated “Having found the bomb we have used it.”2 This is espe-
cially true if the weapons have proven to be (or are projected to be) ex-
tremely effective.3 In many cases, the production and employment of these 
weapons has proceeded, despite attempts to regulate the advancing technol-
ogy based on fears concerning its effects. As Professor Watts has detailed in 
his article in this same volume concerning the susceptibility of weapons to 
legal regulation, the crossbow and various firearms provide interesting illus-
trations.4  
In the case of the crossbow, despite the effort of the Lateran Council 
of 1139,5 members of the Council were unable to prevent the widespread 
production and use of the crossbow.6 The practical concern that the weap-
on allowed a peasant, who was traditionally of little value as a fighter, to kill 
a knight, an asset of great value and a major investment in training and 
equipment, was insufficient to create a viable legal prohibition that survived 
the vote that was taken to sustain it.7 Once developed and in the arsenal, 
the crossbow proved too useful to constrain through legal regulation. 
With respect to firearms, in addition to various attempts to limit partic-
ular types,8 Japan’s attempts to proscribe the whole category of firearms 
from its society failed after only a short period of time.9 The effectiveness 
of the new technology was too great for a nation to resist its benefits, par-
ticularly in the face of competitor nations who embraced the technology to 
their great advantage. 
While the persistence of new weapons has generally been the case 
throughout history, there are examples of exceptions where weapons were 
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developed (or were in the process of development) and then proscribed in 
whole or in part. Examples include the use of lightweight exploding projec-
tiles,10 bullets that expand on impact,11 the use of poisonous gases and bac-
teriological weapons,12 landmines13 and chemical weapons.14 But even in 
these “successful” cases, the law generally did not evolve to proscribe these 
weapons until States had employed them and had time to determine the 
legalities of their use on the battlefield. In other words, the most effective 
use of the law to regulate weapons often requires time for them to be de-
veloped and employed, and the impact of their use reviewed.15 
As Professor Watts points out, there have also been efforts throughout 
history to ban new or novel weapons that are based on emerging technolo-
gy or concepts and that are soon to be produced and employed.16 Though 
blinding lasers were successfully limited very early on in their develop-
ment,17 other examples of this proactive regulation are extremely limited. 
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note 3, at 580–85. 
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As he notes, the newness or “novelty” of a weapon system is one of the 
primary factors in determining and predicting the weapon’s susceptibility to 
regulation, and argues that “[a]t present, a ‘wait and see’ approach seems to 
prevail with respect to prospective or early regulation of novel military 
technology.”18  
Professor Watt’s assertion that the “wait and see” approach is prevalent 
with new technologies is likely to be seriously tested in the upcoming dec-
ades. With the onset of emerging technologies in the twenty-first century, 
the international community is on the verge of developing weapons that 
will dramatically change the character of the modern battlefield. The emer-
gence of cyber operations, the military application of nanotechnology, in-
novations in and increased accessibility of virology, advances in robotics 
(including autonomous weapons) and artificial intelligence, and the devel-
opment of directed energy weapons and other weapons created through 
science fiction-like technology will likely result in new or “novel” weapons 
systems.19  
Some efforts have already been made to determine the application of 
the law to emerging technologies,20 and there have already been calls for 
the outright ban of some developing weapons.21 As States and other actors 
in the international community proactively consider the emergence of these 
new weapon systems and potential attempts to regulate or even preclude 
future development, they should look to the law of armed conflict (LOAC) 
as a means of guiding their deliberations. Inherent in LOAC is a signaling 
function which provides significant input to States as new weapons are 
considered, discussed, debated, created and employed.22 
This signaling function is somewhat unique to LOAC, particularly 
within the paradigm of international law, since it is so heavily dependent on 
State practice. LOAC specifically, and public international law more gener-
ally, develop based on consensual agreements between States and, in the 
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absence of codification, also on the practice of States when done with a 
sense of legal obligation.23 As States develop new technologies, they will 
look to existing law and the current practice of other States in order to de-
termine how best to apply current law to changing circumstances. In other 
words, LOAC rules and principles that guide the use of existing weapons 
also serve the purpose of signaling rules and principles to nations that will 
guide their decisions on what new technologies to weaponize and how to 
do so in a way that ensures compliance with the laws of war. For example, 
as will be discussed in greater detail below, as States consider the future use 
of robotics on the battlefield, the existing LOAC rules and principles signal 
to those States how to develop robotics in a way that will allow their lawful 
use as opposed to some methods of development that would produce 
weapon systems that could not comply with LOAC constraints.  
I have argued elsewhere that “[a]s the LOAC evolves to face anticipat-
ed future threats, its signaling function will help ensure that advancing 
technologies comply with the foundational principles of the LOAC and 
that future armed conflicts remain constrained by law.”24 A review of histo-
ry demonstrates the prudence of this approach, and teaches that the inter-
national community should resist calls for overregulating or banning new 
technologies prematurely in order to allow LOAC to serve its signaling 
function of providing appropriate and adequate guidance as States move 
forward in developing advanced weapons based on emerging technologies. 
This article will first look at historical examples of attempts to prema-
turely regulate or ban weapons that used emerging technologies, based on 
claims that the law as it then existed would be insufficient to control their 
use. In these cases, time proved that the warnings of impending catastro-
phe were ill-founded. The article will then discuss how the law evolved to 
develop a signaling function that acts as a sufficient restraint on the devel-
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opment of emerging technologies. As States effectively apply the LOAC 
signaling function to weapons development, even those using new and 
novel emerging technologies, it will guide the development of these weap-
on systems to ensure legal compliance and also signal when an evolution in 
the law is necessary to adequately regulate their use on the modern battle-
field. 
Before progressing further, it is important to note that this article deals 
only with the law, and not the myriad policy, moral and ethical reasons that 
might exist for regulating or banning weapon systems. The current debate 
on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWs) provides an appropriate 
example. While there may be many reasons why individuals and States may 
object to the development of these weapons, and those reasons may prove 
decisive and result in a ban, LOAC is not a good basis for this argument.25 
As said by the Greek delegation to the Certain Conventional Weapons 
Convention Meeting of Experts in April 2015, “to argue that LAWs com-
ply or do not comply with IHL at this stage would amount to an oracle of 
Delphi. What is left then is basically an ethical question, not a legal one.”26  
 
II. HISTORY AND LESSONS LEARNED 
 
Claims that developing weapons systems are, first, not capable of being 
regulated and, second, will be unable to comply with LOAC are not new. 
In fact, the twentieth century saw many such claims. In the vast majority of 
cases these claims were ultimately shown to be unfounded. In some cases, 
many of which are mentioned above, upon deliberate consideration, na-
tions banded together to limit or ban specific weapons, sometimes for legal 
reasons, but mostly for practical battlefield reasons. This Part provides sev-
eral examples of premature claims to overregulate or ban emerging weapon 
systems, beginning with balloons.27 The attempts to regulate were prema-
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ture because the rules and principles of LOAC were sufficient, when 
properly applied by States, to signal to States how the weapons should be 




The 1899 Hague Peace Conference was convened at the request of the 
Russian Tsar, Nicholas II, and addressed several new technologies, includ-
ing balloons, asphyxiating gases and dum-dum bullets.28 At the time, bal-
loons were an emerging technology and their use on the battlefield was the 
subject of military experimentation. As the conference convened, there had 
been a great deal of discussion, and even uproar, about the use of balloons 
in warfare, including allegations that they could not be used in a manner 
that would comply with LOAC. The original proposal before the confer-
ence was to completely ban the launching of projectiles from balloons and 
other similar new methods because of their potential risk to civilians.29 Af-
ter much discussion among the delegations, the outright ban was rejected 
and a temporary moratorium in the form of a declaration was accepted to 
give time to study the future potential use of balloons.30 As argued by the 
Dutch delegate, the delegates were uncertain “as to how to proceed in light 
of the astonishing ‘progress of science’ which resulted in the realization of 
devices ‘hitherto beyond belief.’”31 The declaration prohibited launching 
projectiles from “balloons or other similar new methods” for five years32 to 
provide time for the weapons to be developed and States to more fully un-
derstand the application of the technology. The topic was scheduled to be 
reconsidered at the next Hague conference. 
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The Second Hague Peace Conference occurred in 1907 and continued 
the focus on regulating emerging technologies, including aerial bombard-
ment from balloons. After much discussion, the temporary moratorium on 
aerial bombardment was renewed “for a period extending to the close of 
the [next] Peace Conference,”33 again providing time for continuing evalua-
tion. Several countries, including Germany, Russia and France, did not sign 
the declaration,34 and the then-anticipated third Hague conference never 
occurred due to the onset of World War I (WWI). Furthermore, because of 
the reciprocal nature of the Hague restrictions, the aerial bombardment 
provisions were not deemed enforceable during WWI, which led not only 
to significant military aerial attacks during the war, but also to increased 
regulation afterwards. 
This example illustrates two important points. First, the attempts to en-
force a ban on the use of an effective and easily weaponized technology did 
not survive the onslaught of war. Nations quickly recognized the effective-
ness of aerial bombardment, including the use of balloons, and determined 
that they could effectively employ this emerging technology in compliance 
with existing LOAC. Second, the nations at the conference recognized that 
they had insufficient information concerning the new technology to war-
rant an all-out ban, but rather opted to provide a legal pause to study the 
future uses of the weapon system and determine if legal compliance was 
possible. If legal compliance was possible, there would be no reason for a 
ban. The determination of whether legal compliance would be possible 
would be based on an analysis of the capabilities of the developing tech-
nology, in light of current LOAC rules and principles. Not only would the 
potential legality of using the emerging technology be judged against cur-
rent LOAC, but LOAC would also be the barometer by which the devel-
opment of future weapons would be guided. If balloons could be devel-
oped in a way that complied with LOAC, their development could pro-
ceed. If not, their proposed development would have to be adjusted or dis-
continued. 
In the wake of WWI, the international community determined that de-
spite the carnage wrought in that war, particularly from new technologies, 
                                                                                                                      
33. Convention (XIII) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval 
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26, 1910. 
34. THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at 237 













the appropriate response was not to ban these weapons, but to submit 
them to more detailed regulation. As Telford Taylor has written,  
 
the enormous carnage of World War I stimulated public demand for 
measures to prevent a recurrence of such slaughter and destruction. Mili-
tary and diplomatic interest was rekindled in the use of multinational trea-
ties not only to limit armaments, but also to govern their use. The air-
plane, the submarine, and poison gas had profoundly affected the con-
duct of the war, and it was to these relatively new weapons, largely un-
touched by the Hague Conventions, that attention now turned.35 
 
Subsequent legal developments have been documented elsewhere,36 but 
only in the case of poisonous gas did the nations of the world resort to an 
outright ban. In the other cases, LOAC was able to not only evolve and 
adapt to the uses of these weapons, but also signal to States key principles 
concerning the future development and employment of these weapons in a 




Submarines had also been a topic of discussion at the 1899 Hague Confer-
ence. As with balloons, the proposal for an all-out ban was not accepted.37 
Submarines were again discussed during the 1907 Convention, but nothing 
was ultimately done in terms of regulation. In other words, despite States’ 
knowledge that submarines would be used in the next conflict, no agree-
ment was reached with respect to regulating or banning submarine opera-
tions. Instead, the nations of the world left their operations to be governed 
by existing customary law.  
Serious discussion about submarines next arose during the Washington 
Naval Conference in 1921. During the conference, Lord Balfour, who was 
the British delegate, called for a prohibition on submarines. He argued: 
 
Is there any man who doubts that if they are once let loose to deal with 
merchantmen their powers will not in the stress of war be abused in the 
future as they have been so grossly abused in the past? . . . I do not think, 
as I have already indicated, that it is the fighting use of the submarine 
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which is really before us now. The question before use now is whether 
you are going to encourage an instrument of war which, if it be encour-
aged, if indeed it be permitted at all, will undoubtedly be used in the ille-
gitimate destruction of commerce.38 
 
When it became apparent that the majority of States did not agree with 
this proposal and that ultimately the conference was going to take no ac-
tion on the issue of submarines, Lord Balfour and the British delegation 
went on record saying, “[T]he use of submarines, whilst of small value for 
defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which are inconsistent with the 
laws of war and the dictates of humanity, and the delegation desires that 
united action should be taken by all nations to forbid their maintenance, 
construction, or employment.”39 
By the 1930s, the discussion had turned from banning submarines to 
regulating them through legal agreement. The requisite legal agreement 
among States was often based on accepted principles of custom, without 
any specific reference to the unique aspects of the emerging technology 
that submarines represented. For example, in Article 22 of the London 
Treaty the drafters chose to apply international law standards to subma-
rines similar to those applied to surface vessels. It states: 
 
The following are accepted as established rules of international law:  
 
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must con-
form to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are 
subject. 
 
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being 
duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, 
whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapa-
ble of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed pas-
sengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose 
the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety 
of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather 
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conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another ves-
sel which is in a position to take them on board.40 
 
Article 22 became known as the London Submarine Protocol of 1936,41 
and forty nations eventually subscribed to it.42 However, because of its lack 
of practical application to the emerging technology, it was almost com-
pletely disregarded once WWII began, with neither side of the conflict 
complying with the Protocol.43 Nevertheless, nations did apply legal limits 
to submarine warfare, hearkening to existing rules of humanity and dis-
crimination to regulate this new technology through adaption of practical 
rules and customary norms to the specifics of the advanced weapon sys-
tem. 
So, as with balloons, the passage of time proved that existing LOAC 
rules and principles were sufficient to signal to States how they should em-
ploy this new weapon system. In this case, appropriately applying the prin-
ciple of distinction was capable of preventing the mass atrocities envi-




Another interesting example of regulating new technologies is the advent 
of airplanes. As airplanes emerged as a weapon of war, similar discussions 
occurred as to the application of the law. As previously mentioned, aerial 
bombardment had been a part of the discussion at both Hague confer-
ences, but no new rules were promulgated to control the use of aircraft. At 
the post-WWI 1921 Conference on the Limitation of Armament, the at-
tendees determined that  
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openDocument&documentId=05F68B7BFFB8B984C12563CD00519417. 
41. Procés-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of 
the Treaty of London of 22 April 1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S 353.  
42. Treaties and States Parties to such Treaties, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ 
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the use of aircraft in war should be covered by the rules of warfare as 
adapted to aircraft, by a further conference which should be held at a lat-
er date. . . . [T]he late war had revealed the imperative necessity for the 
adoption of new rules of warfare, and that these new rules of warfare 
should be framed so as to take into account the development of the sci-
ence of aeronautics and its application to war.44 
 
It is interesting to note that even after the assertion that the existing 
rules of warfare were not quite sufficient to regulate aerial warfare, States 
were not ready to ban the use of aircraft, a highly effective tool of warfare, 
but rather sought to evolve LOAC to ensure that the basic principles of 
war could be properly applied to this new method of warfare. This is an 
important lesson for our time as nations consider emerging technologies 
and their weaponization. 
This “further conference” resulted in the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial 
Warfare,45 which though somewhat innovative, were never formally adopt-
ed, leaving only the customary rules to guide air warfare through World 
War II (WWII). In the aftermath of the war, the targeting rules for air war-
fare gained increased specificity as the international community tried to 
grapple with the results of aerial bombardment in WWII. 
While a ban of aircraft in war and aerial bombardment might have 
seemed legally required by some commentators in 1899 and the subsequent 
decades, the passage of time and the conduct of warfare clearly demon-
strated that the use of aircraft in armed conflict was not legally impermissi-
ble, but that LOAC was clearly capable, with some evolution, of regulating 
this “novel” method of warfare.  
 
D. Atomic and Nuclear Weapons 
 
Atomic and nuclear weapons provide another lens through which to look 
at how the law deals with emerging technologies. The use of atomic weap-
ons in WWII and the subsequent development and evolution of nuclear 
weapons has led to a wide variety of attempted regulation, including limita-
tion,46 non-proliferation47 and complete destruction.48 Unlike chemical and 
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biological weapons, nuclear weapons have not become subject to any gen-
eral prohibition, as evidenced by the 1996 International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) advisory opinion concerning the legality of the threat or use of nucle-
ar weapons.49 After a lengthy discussion concerning why the use of nuclear 
weapons might violate a number of general legal principles, the ICJ notori-
ously admits: 
 
Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed as a 
whole, as examined above by the Court, and of the elements of fact at its 
disposal, the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive con-
clusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a 
State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very surviv-
al would be at stake.50 
 
Though not banned, States have commonly recognized that the general 
principles of LOAC apply to the use of nuclear weapons.51 This is signifi-
cant, especially as advances in nanotechnology impact the size, destructive 
capability and effects of nuclear weapons. Emerging technologies will in-
teract with nuclear weapons in a way that may remove or reduce many of 
the existing legal objections to use of these weapons. As developers under-
stand LOAC and consider its implications on the evolution of nuclear 
weapons, it is much more likely that innovative nuclear weapons will de-
velop within the realm of law. 
 
E. Cyber Weapons 
 
Finally, the recent development and deployment of cyber weapons demon-
strate the value of LOAC signaling to emerging technologies. States have 
taken different approaches to cyber weapons, with some calling for the ban 
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of particular cyber tools52 and others arguing for the complete demilitariza-
tion of cyberspace.53 While it is now generally agreed that the use of cyber 
tools in armed conflict is governed by LOAC,54 how that is to be done is 
still a matter of dispute. Commentaries by experts concerning the applica-
tion of the law to cyber activities covers the entire spectrum from those 
arguing that existing law is sufficiently flexible to respond to new cyber ca-
pabilities without need for adaptation55 to others who argue that a whole 
new set of rules should be written to provide proper guidance.56  
The Naval War College was one of the first institutions to focus on this 
emerging issue by dedicating the entire 2002 volume of International Law 
Studies to the discussion,57 and has hosted several conferences since then on 
the topic. The recently published Tallinn Manual has quickly become the 
foundational treatise on the application of LOAC to cyber weapons. How-
ever, despite its commitment to lex lata over lex ferenda, even the Tallinn 
Manual recognizes the need for the evolution of the law to adequately deal 
with this emerging technology. For example, most of the experts participat-
ing in its development determined that the traditional definition of “attack” 
was insufficient to determine when LOAC applied to cyber activities. In-
stead, a cyber action that affected the functionality of a cyber system might 
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also be considered an attack.58 Nevertheless, even this evolution will take its 
lead from current LOAC, reliant on its signaling role. 
This century of examples has illustrated that with respect to the emer-
gence of new technologies, there is almost always a discussion about the 
ability of the law to properly regulate the technology. And the initial re-
sponses to these new developments often include claims that these weapon 
systems will resist regulation by LOAC and therefore should be banned. As 
the examples have shown, history teaches us that the international com-
munity should resist calls for overregulating or banning new technologies 
prematurely in order to allow LOAC to serve its signaling function, which 
will provide appropriate and adequate guidance as States move forward in 
developing advanced weapons based on emerging technologies. In each of 
these historic cases, LOAC successfully signaled to nations how to best 
proceed. 
As we look ahead, with specific reference to the kinds of emerging 
technologies that will be faced in the near future, the international commu-
nity must be willing to let LOAC play its signaling function, rather than act 
prematurely.  
 
III. LOAC SIGNALING 
 
In the previous Part, it was argued that LOAC serves a signaling function 
sufficient to guide States as they develop advanced weapons based on 
emerging technologies in order to ensure they will be legally compliant. 
This Part will briefly describe how LOAC incorporates the signaling func-
tion as a proactive legal obligation. 
The law has always required compliance with respect to the employ-
ment of weapons. Even when LOAC was underdeveloped and its power to 
affect the conduct of warfare much more limited than it is now, it was fo-
cused on compliance. Francis Lieber, in his famous Lieber Code,59 noted 
the focus of the law on individual actions throughout the Code, particularly 
when he described the transition to a more civilized approach to the treat-
ment of civilians.  
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Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has 
likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction be-
tween the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile 
country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and 
more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, 
property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.”60 
 
Because of the weaponry and tactics of the day, early limitations on 
warfare focused almost exclusively on the application of LOAC during 
times of actual armed conflict. LOAC signaled what could and could not 
be done when engaged in combat. As such, it failed to provide any empha-
sis on proactive measures targeting prospective compliance.  
Recognizing this deficiency, States began to build into LOAC proactive 
duties that were triggered long before the point where the armed forces 
member applied force in combat. For example, the doctrine of command 
responsibility holds a commander criminally responsible for the actions of 
his subordinates under certain circumstances where he could have exer-
cised control and prevented the wrongdoing.61 This doctrine effectively 
requires a commander to embark on a course of pre-conflict LOAC train-
ing, coupled with a system of accountability and rigid respect for authority 
in order to ensure that subordinates comply with LOAC and do not engage 
in conduct that would implicate the commander’s personal criminal re-
sponsibility. The emergence of this and similar principles led to recognition 
of the need for effective LOAC signaling long before the actual fighting 
broke out. 
Progressively, States have imbued LOAC with a requirement to proac-
tively incorporate the law when developing new weapons, well before they 
will be employed on the battlefield where a soldier would be governed by 
the principles of humanity and distinction. This requirement is most clearly 
stated in Article 36 of 1977 Additional Protocol I (API) which provides,  
 
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, 
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obliga-
tion to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circum-
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stances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of interna-
tional law applicable to the High Contracting Party.62 
 
This obligation clearly binds States which are party to API, but according 
to the ICRC, it is also “arguably one that applies to all States, regardless of 
whether or not they are party to Additional Protocol I.”63  
Much has been written about this requirement which does not need to 
be repeated here.64 Suffice it to say that LOAC generally obligates every 
State that is contemplating developing a new technology or weaponizing an 
existing technology to ensure that such development or weaponization 
complies with existing rules and principles of LOAC, particularly the pro-
scription on weapons that might cause unnecessary suffering. In other 
words, as States contemplate emerging technologies, LOAC signals what is 
permissible and what is impermissible in weapons development.65  
Despite not being a party to API, the U.S. practice in this area is very 
clear. Even prior to API coming into effect, the United States required 
such reviews,66 and that obligation remains today. The codification of this 
requirement can be found in Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, 
which states:  
 
The acquisition and procurement of DoD weapons and weapon systems 
shall be consistent with all applicable domestic law and treaties and inter-
national agreements . . . customary international law, and the law of 
armed conflict (also known as the laws and customs of war). An attorney 
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authorized to conduct such legal reviews in the Department shall conduct 
the legal review of the intended acquisition of weapons or weapons sys-
tems.67 
 
Each military service has an attorney designated to do such reviews68 
who will be given detailed information on the proposed design and specifi-
cations of a new weapon, along with its intended use and capabilities. The 
legal adviser performing the review will compare the weapon with current 
LOAC for signals as to its legality, relying on prior analogous reviews, as 
well as carefully considering the basic rules and principles of LOAC. To the 
extent these reviews identify concerns, those are provided to the weapon’s 
developer so that the weapon can be altered, corrected or abandoned.  
This requirement is comprehensive and would clearly apply to all new 
and developing technologies that States may be considering, including truly 
“novel” weapon systems where there are no previous analogs with which 
to compare. In such cases, the legal adviser may find himself much like 
Harold Koh who, while serving as the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, argued that “[i]ncreasingly, we find ourselves addressing 
twenty-first century challenges with twentieth-century laws.”69 However, in 
such cases, the general principles of LOAC continue to apply and provide 
guidance, as contemplated in the century-old Martens Clause.  
 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Con-
tracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under 
the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they 
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result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the 
laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.70  
 
The legal adviser can also have confidence that his review in the devel-
opment stage will be subjected to further legal review each time the weap-
on is employed. Article 82 of API, titled “Legal Advisers in Armed Forc-
es,” states: 
 
The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict 
in time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, 
when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level 
on the application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the ap-
propriate instruction to be given to the armed forces on this subject.71 
 
This layered legal review process creates a circular loop, which provides 
return signals to developers and legal reviewers, thus iteratively building 
compliance with LOAC. As advanced weapons enter the inventory and are 
utilized in combat, their use creates a body of practice that enlightens their 
current deployment and future development, thus enhancing the signaling 




Emerging technologies have always presented States with opportunities to 
create advanced weapons. In the next decade or two, revolutionary tech-
nologies such as the emergence of cyber operations, the military application 
of nanotechnology, innovations in and increased accessibility of virology, 
advances in robotics and artificial intelligence (including autonomous 
weapons), and the development of directed energy weapons will likely re-
sult in new or “novel” weapons systems. Calls have already begun for a ban 
on the weaponization of some of these technologies, many of which use 
LOAC as a basis for the ban. These calls are premature. While there may 
be good moral, political or ethical reasons for such actions, LOAC and its 
system of signaling to States make such bans unnecessary from a legal per-
spective.  
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As history has demonstrated, LOAC signaling will provide appropriate 
and adequate guidance as States move forward in developing advanced 
weapons based on emerging technologies. As States use this signaling 
mechanism through appropriate weapons reviews and feedback from legal 
advisers, advanced weapons can continue to comply with LOAC even 
when based on futuristic emerging technologies. 
